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Abstract
Recommender systems use, amongst others, a mechanism called collaborative ﬁltering (CF) to predict the rating that
a user will give to an item given the ratings of other items provided by other users. While reasonably accurate CF can
be achieved with various well-known techniques, preserving the privacy of rating data from individual users poses a
signiﬁcant challenge. Several privacy preserving schemes have, so far, been proposed in prior work. However, while
these schemes are theoretically feasible, there are many practical implementation diﬃculties on real world public
cloud computing platforms. In this paper, we present our implementation experience and experimental results on
two public Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) enabling Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds: the Google App Engine for Java
(GAE/J) and the Amazon Web Services Elastic Beanstalk (AWS EBS).a
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Introduction
Pooling and sharing of resources, broad network access,
rapid elasticity, on-demand service provisioning (with a
strong self-service element), oﬀering of measured service,
supporting (although not necessitating) multi-tenancy,
are some of the features that characterise cloud comput-
ing. Cloud architecture oﬀers a means of delivering ICT
infrastructure, platform (i.e. application execution envi-
ronment) and software as a service. The beneﬁts promised
by this paradigm include cost and performance optimi-
sation, economy of scale, ﬂexible utilisation and charging
model, ease of connectivity and access to shared services,
cost eﬃcient introduction of redundancy and continu-
ity of provision. Security, resilience and compliance are
some of the main concerns that are challenging wider use
of cloud computing and most likely to drive remaining
innovation and market diﬀerentiation eﬀorts in this area.
The rapid growth of information services provided over
the World Wide Web has resulted in individuals hav-
ing to sift through overwhelming volumes of information
– the problem of information overload [1]. Recommen-
dation systems have been used as a rescue. Automated
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recommendation systems employ two techniques: pro-
ﬁle analysis and collaborative ﬁltering (CF). The former
matches the items to be recommended using informa-
tion that relate to users’ tastes; while CF makes use of
the recorded preferences of the community. Proﬁle-based
recommendation for a user with rich proﬁle information
is thorough. However, CF is fairly accurate even with-
out the need for the users’ proﬁle information. CF has,
thus, positioned itself as one of the predominant means of
generating recommendations.
Grouped by ﬁltering techniques, numeric rating
based CF is broadly classiﬁed into: memory-based or
neighbourhood-based andmodel-based. Inmemory-based
approaches, recommendations are developed from user or
item neighbourhoods, i.e. proximity (or deviation) mea-
sures between the ratings, e.g. cosine similarity, Euclidean
distance and various statistical correlation coeﬃcients.
Memory-based CF can also be distinguished into: user-
based and item-based. In the former, CF is performed
using neighbourhood between users computed from
the ratings provided by them. In item-based schemes,
prediction is obtained using item neighbourhoods, i.e.
proximity (or deviation) of ratings between various items.
Inmodel-based approaches, the original user-item ratings
dataset is used to train a compact model, which is then
used for prediction. The model is developed by methods
borrowed from artiﬁcial intelligence, such as Bayesian
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classiﬁcation, latent classes and neural networks; or, from
linear algebra, e.g. singular value decomposition (SVD),
latent semantic indexing (LSI) and principal component
analysis (PCA). Model-based algorithms are usually fast
to query but relatively slow to update.
CF based approaches perform better with the avail-
ability of more data. Cross domain recommendations
are possible, if the corresponding data can be utilised
(e.g. a person with a strong interest in horror movies
may also rate certain Halloween products highly). How-
ever, the sharing of user-item preferential (i.e. rating)
data for use in CF poses signiﬁcant privacy and secu-
rity challenges. Competing organisations, e.g. Netﬂix and
Blockbuster may not wish to share speciﬁc user infor-
mation, even though both may beneﬁt from such shar-
ing. Users themselves might not want detailed informa-
tion about their ratings and buying habits known to any
single organisation. To overcome this, there has been
recent work in privacy-preserving collaborative ﬁlter-
ing (PPCF) that can enable CF without leaking private
information. In CF, achieving accuracy and preserving
privacy are orthogonal problems. The two main direc-
tions of research in privacy-preserving collaborative ﬁl-
tering are: encryption-based and randomisation-based. In
encryption-based techniques, prior to sharing individual
user-item ratings data are encrypted using cryptosystems
that support homomorphic properties. In randomisation-
based privacy preserving techniques, the ratings data is
randomised either through random data swapping or data
perturbation or anonymisation.
However, many theoretically feasible collaborative ﬁl-
tering schemes face practical implementation diﬃculties
in real world computing infrastructures like public cloud
computing platforms. These diﬃculties include computa-
tional complexity, dataset size and hence scalability, and
dependence on trusted third party amongst others. In
this paper, we re-visit the generalised problem of privacy
preserving collaborative ﬁltering: we present and extend
our previously proposed novel approach [2] and realistic
implementations of a privacy preserving weighted Slope
One scheme on the Google App Engine for Java (GAE/J)
and the Amazon Web Services Elastic Beanstalk (AWS
EBS) – two specialised Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
cloud services that enable Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
construction.
Motivating example
With data about individual’s personal preferences being
increasingly stored by applications built atop various
SaaS and PaaS cloud platforms, there is a growing need
to ensure that privacy of such data is preserved while
enabling eﬃcient statistical operations on the data, even
over multiple cloud applications belonging to multiple
cloud sites. Consider the following example: Alice has
seen and rated a number of ﬁlms from the Japanese ani-
mation Studio Ghibli on a ﬁlm rating web application built
on a PaaS cloud. She intends to see the 2011 ﬁlm: FromUp
on Poppy Hill next and would like the ﬁlm rating website
to give her a rating prediction for this ﬁlm based on her
ratings of the other ﬁlms that she has rated as well as such
ratings from the community. She is completely unaware of
(and does not care) who else has rated the various ﬁlms in
this way apart from obtaining a reasonable rating for From
Up on Poppy Hill. Alice also is unwilling to send her entire
rating vector for ﬁlms she has rated to any third party but
is happy to send some in such a way that they are de-linked
from her identity through some anonymising mechanism.
If Alice is to obtain a rating for From Up on Poppy Hill,
she would prefer conﬁdentiality of the information and
also does not want to reveal her identity in the prediction
query. In the future, Alice may also change the ratings for
any of her previously rated ﬁlms.
Objectives
In short, we aim to build a privacy preserving collaborative
ﬁltering scheme on the cloud for any item such that:
1. a contributing user does not have to reveal his/her
entire rating vector to any other party,
2. any individual parts of information revealed by a user
are insuﬃcient to launch an inference based attack to
reveal any additional information,
3. a trusted third party is not required for either model
construction or for prediction,
4. the scheme is robust to insider threats to data privacy
from the cloud infrastructure itself,
5. the scheme has acceptable eﬃciency (in terms of
speed) as well as a high prediction accuracy.
We also assume honest but curious user participation,
although we discuss in this paper what happens if we
give up this assumption. The formal problem statement is
presented in Section “Problem Statement”.
To achieve this, in our approach, the user will assume
the presence of anonymising techniques (e.g. IPv4 net-
work address translation and dynamic IPs, anonymiser
networks such as Tor, and pseudonymous identities; see:
[3-9]) to de-identify himself/herself from his/her ratings
suﬃciently such that the complete rating vector for a
user cannot be reconstructed. Thus our security guaran-
tees are based upon the security guarantees provided by
the underlying anonymisingmechanism, and are bounded
by it.
Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is that we build
on our previously proposed work [2] and show that it
is feasible to implement on both Amazon and Google
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Software-as-a-Service enabling Platform-as-a-Service
clouds. We also include discussions on possible exten-
sions of our idea. Note that other existing PPCF schemes
do not have any cloud based implementations, hence our
results are not comparable with implementation results
of such PPCF schemes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in
§“Related Work”, we list some of the related work in pri-
vacy preserving collaborative ﬁltering. In §“Background”,
we introduce the building blocks for our proposed
scheme, which is presented in §“Proposed Scheme”. We
present the comparative evaluation of our implementa-
tion in §“Evaluation” preceded by practical implementa-
tion considerations in §“Implementation Considerations”
before concluding with future directions in §“Conclusion
and Future Work”.
Related work
In recent years, privacy has attracted a lot of atten-
tion. There are a number of existing works on privacy-
preserving collaborative ﬁltering (PPCF). One of the ear-
liest such eﬀorts is due to Canny [10] which uses a partial
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) model and homo-
morphic encryption to devise amulti-party PPCF scheme.
Canny [11] also proposes a new solution based on a proba-
bilistic factor analysis model that can handle missing data,
and provides privacy through a peer-to-peer protocol.
Polat and Du have also investigated this problem from
several perspectives: in [12], they proposed a random-
ized perturbation technique to protect individual privacy
while still producing accurate recommendations results;
in [13], the authors presented a privacy-preserving pro-
tocol for collaborative ﬁltering over vertically partitioned
data; in [14], a randomisation based SVD approach is
presented, while in [15] the scheme enables recom-
mendations via item-based algorithms using randomized
response techniques.
Berkovsky et al. [16] present a decentralized distributed
storage of user data combined with data modiﬁcation
techniques to mitigate privacy issues. Tada et al. pre-
sented a privacy-preserving item-based collaborative ﬁl-
tering scheme in [17].
Cisse´e and Albayrak [18] develop a method for privacy-
preserving recommender systems based on a multi-agent
technology which enables applications to generate recom-
mendations via various ﬁltering techniques while preserv-
ing the privacy of all participants. Ahmad and Khokar
proposed [19] a privacy preserving collaborative ﬁlter-
ing schemes for web portals using a trusted third party
for threshold decryption. Kaleli and Polat propose [20] a
naı¨ve Bayesian classiﬁer based CF over a P2P topology
where the users protect the privacy of their data using
masking, which is comparable to randomisation. Another
homomorphic encryption based SVD scheme has been
proposed by Han, et al. [21] but the authors also describe
that their scheme does not scale well for realistic datasets.
Gong et al. [22] present a new collaborative ﬁltering
technique based on randomised perturbation and secure
multiparty computation. However, neither are these tech-
niques built for the cloud, nor are they eﬃcient enough for
large-scale general purpose use.
Our work is the ﬁrst PPCF scheme that includes a prac-
tical cloud-based implementation and results. In [23], we
have proposed a privacy preserving (using encryption) CF
scheme based on the well known weighted Slope One
predictor [24]. Our prior scheme is applicable to pure hor-
izontal and pure vertical dataset partitions. The scheme
presented in this paper does not consider dataset parti-
tioning in the cloud because user’s rating data are not
stored in the cloud at all. Even so, the general assumption
is that each user knows only his or her own ratings, and
does know all of them – similar to the case of horizon-
tal partitioning of data outside the cloud. We do include a
discussion on the case of vertical partitioning of data out-
side the cloud. We have also experimented with an actual
implementation on the cloud, but since none of the other
existing work has tested their implementation on a cloud
computing environment, we do not provide any explicit
comparative evaluation.
Background
Slope one predictors for collaborative ﬁltering
The Slope One predictors due to Lemire and McLachlan
[24] are item-based collaborative ﬁltering schemes that
predict the rating of an item for a user from a pair-wise
deviations of item ratings. Slope One CF can be evaluated
in two stages: pre-computation and prediction of ratings.
In the pre-computation stage, the average deviations of












where φa,b is the count of the users who have rated both
items while δi,a,b = ri,a − ri,b is the deviation of the rating
of item a from that of item b both given by user i.
In the prediction stage, the rating for user u and item x
using the weighted Slope One is given as:
ru,x =
∑









The matrices  and φ are called deviation and car-
dinality matrices respectively. These matrices are sparse
matrices. We need to store the upper triangulars only
because the leading diagonal contains deviations and car-
dinalities of ratings between the same items, which are
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irrelevant. The lower triangular for the deviation matrix is
the additive inverse of the upper triangular while that of
the cardinality matrix is the same as its upper triangular.
Privacy threats
The two matrices (deviation and cardinality) contain
information about item pairs only computed from ratings
given by all users, so these do not pose any privacy risk to
any particular user’s rating data. However, there is a pri-
vacy threat to individual user’s rating data at the time of
computing deviations and cardinality from plaintext rat-
ings. This is why we ought to de-link the identities of users
from the submitted ratings such that individual users and
their ratings cannot be conclusively linked to each other.
In addition to that, if the user sends his/her rating vector
to the prediction function then there is a privacy threat.
Therefore, we use encrypted rating prediction.
Anonymity and identiﬁability
The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates why a simple net-
work address translator can provide a certain degree of
anonymity by representing all IP addresses on its LAN
side with just one IP address on its WAN side. A more
complex and cryptographic pseudonymous method of
anonymity was presented in [9].
Despite the importance of anonymity in this privacy
preserving collaborative ﬁltering technique, there is also a
consensus on identiﬁability if there is a pressing need. In
both the case of NAT and the case of pseudonyms, this
identiﬁability can be obtained through information that
the NAT administrator or pseudonymous group mem-
bership issuers provide. The process is not straightfor-
ward and requires oﬄine intervention by administrators.
Hence, the support for identiﬁability does not nullify the
ability to anonymise the data.
Homomorphic cryptosystem
Paillier public-key cryptosystem [25] exhibits addi-
tively homomorphic properties. Denoting encryption and
decryption functions as E() and D() respectively, the
encryption of the sum of two plaintext messages m1 and
m2 is the modular product of their individual ciphertexts:
E(m1 + m2) = E(m1) · E(m2) (3)
and, the encryption of the product of one plaintext mes-
sages m1 and a plaintext integer multiplicand π is the
modular exponentiation of the ciphertext of m1 with π as
the exponent:
E(m1 · π) = E(m1)π . (4)
The Paillier cryptosystem with optimisations are
described in three steps: key generation (algorithm 1),
encryption (algorithm 2) and decryption (algorithm 3).
Algorithm 1
Paillier cryptosystem key generation.
1: Generate two large prime numbers p and q,
each with half the speciﬁed modulus bit
length for the cryptosystem.
Figure 1 Typical anonymity that can be obtained through a network address translator.
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Ensure: gcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1 and p = q.
2: Modulus n = pq and pre-compute n2.
3: Compute
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = (p−1)(q−1)gcd(p−1,q−1) .
4: g ← (1 + n). {Optimised here but originally:
select random g ∈ Z∗n2 such that n divides the
order of g.}
Ensure: gcd(L(gλ mod n2), n) = 1 where
L(u) = u−1n . {Optimisation:
gλ mod n2 = (1 + nλ) mod n2.}
5: Pre-compute the modular multiplicative
inverse μ = L(gλ mod n2)−1 mod n.




Require: Plaintextm ∈ Zn.
1: Choose random r ∈ Z∗n.
2: return: Ciphertext c ← (1 + mn) rn mod n2.
{Optimised here but originally:
c ← gmrn mod n2.}
Algorithm 3
Paillier decryption algorithm.
Require: Ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 .
1: return: Plaintext
m ← L(cλ mod n2)μ mod n.
Our implementation of Paillier cryptosystem supports
negative numbers for plaintext because quite often a devi-
ation of two ratings can be negative.We have used an opti-
mised version of a non-threshold Paillier cryptosystem.
Due to the absence of the threshold servers, decryption
is faster than the threshold version. To cater for negative
plaintext inputs, we divide the ring of n in two parts and
consider any plaintextm ≥ n2 as negative.
Problem statement
The problem can be formally deﬁned in the following
fashion:
Deﬁnition [Privacy-Preserving weighted Slope One Pre-
dictor] Given a set of m users u1, . . . ,um that may rate
any number of n items i1, . . . , in, build the weighted Slope
One predictor for each item satisfying the following two
constraints:
• no submitted rating should be deterministically
linked back to any user.
• any user should be able to obtain a prediction
without leaking his/her private rating information.
Note that this closely corresponds to the perfect hor-
izontal partitioning case, wherein each site contains the
data of one single user. However, this is not quite the same,
since each user may not rate all of the items.
Proposed scheme
Akin to the original Slope One CF scheme, our proposed
extension also contains a pre-computation phase and a
prediction phase. Pre-computation is an on-going pro-
cess as users add, update or delete pair-wise ratings or
deviations. The overall user-interaction diagram of our
proposedmodel is presented in Figure 2 showing the addi-
tion of rating data and an example CF prediction query.
It illustrates users, Alice and Bob, each submitting plain-
text (item) pair-wise deviations of ratings of items through
an identity anonymiser to the Software-as-a-Service cloud
application. Another user, Carol, then queries and obtains
a prediction for an arbitrary item (item k, in the exam-
ple) with her encrypted query vector. The SaaS cloud
application computes the prediction using homomorphic
encryption and responds to Carol with an encrypted
answer, which only Carol herself can decrypt.
Pre-computation
In the pre-computation phase, the plaintext deviation
matrix and the plaintext cardinality matrix are com-
puted. In the absence of full rating vectors from users
and consistent user identiﬁcation, the combination of
the deviation and the cardinality matrices pose no pri-
vacy threat to the users’ private rating data. The col-
lection of the rating data is done pair-wise and after
the user identity is de-linked in the process through
the use of known techniques, such as anonymising net-
works, mixed networks, pseudonymous group mem-
berships, and so on. User submits a pair of ratings
or the corresponding deviation to the cloud applica-
tion at any point in time. Thus, if the user originally
rated n items then n(n−1)2 pair-wise ratings or devi-
ations should be submitted. Since the user’s identity
(e.g. a pseudonym or an IP address) can (rather, must)
change between consecutive submissions, the cloud can-
not deterministically link the rating vector to a particular
user.
Case of new ratings
In the pre-computation stage, the average deviations of
ratings from item a to item b is given in equation 1.
The cloud application only maintains a list of items;
their pairwise deviations and cardinalities but no other
user data. The process of rating addition is described in
algorithm 4.
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Figure 2 User-interaction diagram of our scheme.
Algorithm 4
An algorithm for the addition of new ratings.
Require: An item pair identiﬁed by a and b,
ratings ra and rb, or the deviation δa,b = ra − rb has
been submitted.
1: Find the deviation a,b and cardinality φa,v.
2: {While looking for deviations and
cardinalities, also look for their inverses, i.e.
b,a and φb,a because only the upper
triangular is stored. If the inverses are
retrieved then deviation must be inverted
before operating on it.}
3: if a,b and φa,b not found then
4: a,b ← 0 and φa,b ← 0.
5: end if
6: Update ′a,b ← a,b + δa,b and
φ′a,b ← φa,b + 1.
7: Store ′a,b and φ′a,b.
Ensure:While storing, write to the inverses ′b,a
and φ′b,a if these were initially retrieved. {If the
inverses were retrieved then deviation must be
inverted before storing it.}
8: Audit this add operation in the datastore, e.g.
using user’s IP address as the identity. {This
is a typical insider threat in the cloud.}
Updates and deletions
Updates or deletions of existing rating data are possible.
For example, say the user has rated item a and b before-
hand. When it comes to updating, he/she can notify the
cloud of the diﬀerence between the new pair-wise rating
deviation and the previous one and ﬂag it to the cloud that
it is an update. The process of rating update is described in
algorithm 5. Similarly, for the delete operation, the addi-
tive inverse of the previous deviation, i.e. −δa,b is sent by
the user to the cloud signifying a deletion. The process of
rating deletion is also described in algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5
An algorithm for the updates or deletions of existing
ratings.
Require: In case of update, an item pair identiﬁed
by a and b, and diﬀδa,b,δ′a,b ; or in case of deletion: an
item pair identiﬁed by a and b, and −δa,b.
1: Find the deviation a,b and cardinality φa,b.
2: {While looking for deviations and
cardinalities, also look for their inverses, i.e.
b,a and φb,a because only the upper
triangular is stored. If the inverses are
retrieved then deviation must be inverted
before operating on it.}
3: if a,b and φa,b not found then
4: print error!
5: end if
6: In case of an update,
′a,b ← a,b + diﬀδa,b ,δ′a,b ; or in case of
deletion: ′a,b ← a,b − δa,b and
φ′a,b ← φx,y − 1.
7: Store ′a,b and φ′a,b, if φ′a,b was changed in
case of deletion.
Ensure:While storing, write to the inverses ′b,a
and φ′b,a if these were initially retrieved. {If the
inverses were retrieved then deviation must be
inverted before storing it.}
8: Audit this update or deletion operation in the
datastore, e.g. using user’s IP address as the
identity. {This is a typical insider threat in the
cloud.}
Prediction
In the prediction phase, the user queries the cloud with
an encrypted and complete rating vector. The encryption
is carried out at the user’s end with the user’s public key.
The prediction query, thus, also includes the user’s public
key, which is then used by the cloud to encrypt the nec-
essary elements from the deviation matrix and to apply
homomorphic multiplication according to the prediction
equation deﬁned in equation 5, where D() and E() are
decryption and encryption operations, x,a is the devi-
ation of ratings between item x and item a; φx,a is their
relative cardinality and E(ru,a) is an encrypted rating on
item a sent by user u, although the identity of the user is
irrelevant in this process. Note that the ﬁnal decryption
is again performed at the user’s end with the user’s pri-
vate key, thereby eliminating the need of any trusted third















The steps for the prediction is shown in algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6
An algorithm for the prediction of an item.
Require: An item x for which the prediction is to
be made, a vector RE = E(ra|a =x) of encrypted
ratings for other items rated by the user (i.e. each
item a|a = x) and the public key pku of user u.
1: total cardinality: tc ← 0; total deviation:
td ← 0; total encrypted weight: tew ← E(0);
total encrypted deviation: ted ← E(0).
2: for j = 1 → length( RE) do
3: Find the deviation x,j and
cardinality φx,j.
4: {While looking for deviations and
cardinalities, also look for their
inverses, i.e. j,x and φj,x because
only the upper triangular is stored. If
the inverses are retrieved then
deviation must be inverted before
operating on it.}
5: if x,j and φx,j found then
6: td ← td + x,j.
7: tc ← tc + φx,j.
8: tew ← E(tew)(E(rj)φx,j).






11: ted ← (E(tew)E(td)). {This is a
homomorphic addition.}
12: return ted and tc. {User decrypts ted ; the
predicted result is ru,x = D(ted)tc }
In the scheme described above, there is, in fact, one pri-
vacy leakage in the prediction phase: the number of items
in the user’s original rating vector. This can be addressed
by computing the prediction at the user’s end with the
necessary elements from the deviation and cardinality
matrices obtained from the cloud. The user can mask the
actual rating vector by asking the cloud for an unnecessary
number of extra items. Note that the only privacy leakage
in the prediction stage is the list of items in the query vec-
tor. The corresponding ratings can only be decrypted by
the user’s private key. Further to this, the user is free to use
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a diﬀerent key pair for each prediction request such that
a single public key cannot be used by an adversary to link
the queries together.
Vertical partition across multiple organisations
While the solution presented above works when each
user knows their own ratings, it will not work if there
are two or more cloud applications with disjoint item
and user sets (e.g. Yahoo movies, Netﬂix and IMDB have
their own cloud applications), the prior PPCF solution will
work if we extend our scheme as follows. For example,
assume the two applications know the values ra and rb
respectively for two diﬀerent items for the same user. To
compute the deviation ra−rb for that user without reveal-
ing it to either or to any third site, assume that the ﬁrst
application randomly splits the value ra into two shares
(thus, randomly chooses za1 ∈ Z and compute za2 ∈ Z
such that ra = za1 + za2). Similarly, the other applica-
tion randomly chooses zb1 and computes zb2 such that
rb = zb1 + zb2. The ﬁrst application sends za2 to the
other, and after receiving −zb1 from it, computes c1 =
za1 − zb1, while the other computes c2 = za2 − zb2.
Finally, both can send c1 and c2 respectively in an unlink-
able fashion to the cloud PPCF application, which obtains
c1 + c2 = za1 − zb1 + za2 − zb2 = ra − rb. It is pos-
sible to do this with k cloud applications as well, where
each value is split into k splits, to make the process more
resistant to collusion. Note that one problem with this
approach is that the same deviation is split over the k
splits – eﬀectively, cardinality is increased by k instead of
by 1. One approximate ﬁx for this is simply to increase
the deviation k-fold. Thus, each application will send in
k ∗ ci, instead of ci. However, this will only approximate
the eﬀect since instead of adding the true deviation and
1, we end up adding k times the true deviation and k.
Alternatively, the cardinalities can be ﬁxed by exposing a
reduction capability, so that anyone can reduce the cardi-
nalities appropriately in an unlinkable fashion. Assuming
semi-honest participants, this works ﬁne. If this is not
suitable, the cardinalities can also be computed correctly
by ﬂagging to the PPCF application that submissions of
all ck splits should be treated as one submission. However,
in this case, the linkage between the splits will be estab-
lished and now the security relies on the lack of collusion
among all k applications. We will explore this issue more
in the future, and also leave the experimental results for it
for future work.
Implementation considerations
In this section, we present the various considerations
and strategies that we have employed in the implemen-
tation of the aforementioned scheme on the Google App
Engine for Java and the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk cloud
platforms.
Database access and conﬁgurability
Cache based datastore access in the Google App Engine
From the documentation of Google App Engine for Java
(GAE/J) and from our experiments, we observe that the
I/O operations with the datastore are CPU intensive. To
speed up several concurrent lookup operations, we have
used the GAE/J Memcache API which is a distributed
in-memory cache. In the aforementioned algorithms,
the deviation and cardinality matrices are read from the
cache; and the datastore only if not found in cache. On the
other hand, write operations to those matrices are done
simultaneously to the cache and the datastore to ensure
consistency. Although values in the cache are volatile,
in the case of a cache-hit, the read operation is quicker
than the datastore read operation. For writing, however,
we have to ﬂush the updates to the cache immediately in
order to ensure consistency between the cache and the
datastore. In our experimental implementation, we have
a transactional write-(to-datastore)-immediately strat-
egy. However, with multiple concurrent requests to the
servlets, this may generate performance delays. In future,
we plan to use a mechanism for optimised, consistent
asynchronous writes to the datastore.
Direct database access in the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk
Having noticed that the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk allows
signiﬁcantly faster access to the database than Google App
Engine, we have used direct access to the database instead
of using Amazon’s distributed cache service – ElastiCache,
which will be considered in our future work.
Deployment conﬁgurability
From the perspective of conﬁgurability, our deploy-
ment can be made to run on either the Amazon Elastic
Beanstalk or the Google App Engine without changing
any code. We achieved this through modular design of
the backend data access. We used generic data access
techniques and made the data store conﬁguration declar-
ative, which can be changed without aﬀecting the code.
In future, we will extend this capability to facilitate access




While parallelism is not necessary, it can be of help when
the number of items is large, since eﬀectively the num-
ber of deviations is in order of O(n2). Our scheme is
intrinsically parallel in the pre-computation stage. In the
case of a large number of concurrent user rating pair
addition requests, a MapReduce [26] style parallelism in
pre-computation is achieved at the user’s end because the
user submits an item pair instead of the entire rating vec-
tor and GAE/J handles the user requests concurrently.
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Each item pair ratings can be thought of as the output
of a map function, where the key is composited by the
identities of the two items and the value consists of the
deviation of the ratings and the cardinality of unity. The
reduce function in our implementation combines those
individual item-item pairwise deviation-cardinality tuples
to generate the combined value for each item-item pair.
Parallelism in prediction
In the prediction stage, we do not use concurrency yet in
our current prototype. The speed of this process depends
on the size of the cryptosystem modulus as well as the
number of encrypted ratings provided because comput-
ing the encrypted prediction involves encryption and
homomorphic multiplications, which are computationally
expensive.
Inspecting the original Slope One prediction equation 2,
one can see that both the numerator and the denom-
inator on the right hand side of the equation are just
sums on their own. Since the actual division is not done
on the server, an encrypted numerator and the plaintext
denominator is sent to the client as shown in equation 6.
This means that the client is free to submit more than
one queries with disjoint vectors of items in each query
and combine the results to form the ﬁnal prediction.
That is a Map-Reduce style parallelism, which we plan
to implement in future prototypes. From a performance
standpoint, this will ensure that the servlet’s response time
will not be dependent on the size of the encrypted rat-
ing vector provided by the user, and therefore will not be
subject to the GAE/J execution deadline of 30s although
Amazon Elastic Beanstalk presents no such execution
deadline.
Attack model: malicious cloud
The implementation of our model accepts, as input from
a user, ratings for a pair of items, or the deviations of
their ratings. The implementation quietly collects the
user’s IP addresses without the user’s permission (con-
stituting an example attack scenario). With the presence
of IP address, a level of linkability between rating pairs
can be attained. However, through the use of a network
address translator (NAT), or an onion routing protocol
(e.g. Tor) or dynamic IP addresses, the user’s IP addresses
act as pseudonyms with amany-to-many relation between
a pseudonym and a real user, i.e. one IP address may
be re-used by many users and one user may have many
IP addresses over time. This makes predictable linkabil-
ity hard and often incorrect. If the user uses diﬀerent IP
addresses for each separate pair of ratings then at any
point in time, the server can at most link only one pair
of ratings to a user. In reality, it will link more (and these
are wrong) because of the IP addresses being re-used by
other users.
Note that the server can also use browser-based cook-
ies to more uniquely identify a particular browser, hence a
user. However, we limit our discussion of the attack model
to IP addresses only because even with browser cookies,
it is possible for the same user to be identiﬁed separately,
e.g. using more than one browsers; or diﬀerent users iden-
tiﬁed by the same browser, e.g. a browser on a publicly
shared user account. In addition browser cookies can be
selectively blocked and the users can be warned of such
cookies, thus making the user identiﬁcation process less
transparent than the one using IPs.
Potential extension to vertical partitions
While we have not explicitly experimented with an imple-
mentation of the algorithms for vertical partitions (given
in Section “Vertical Partition Across Multiple Organi-
sations”), we now discuss potential implementation and
performance. It is important to note that the communica-
tion between the applications is independent of the PPCF
application residing in the PaaS cloud. The diﬀerent appli-
cations, holding vertical partitions, will need to follow
some protocol to exchange randomised values between
each other. From the perspective of the PPCF applica-
tion, the performance should be largely unaﬀected by the
process because the addition of the diﬀerent randomised
parts can happen in parallel. Once submitted, those parts
are used to update the internal deviation matrix. The
query stage is completely unaﬀected by this process, and
so is the time performance of the query. The only scope
of a performance slowdown depends on how fast the indi-
vidual applications collaborate with each other to generate
the partial randomised deviations.
Evaluation
We evaluated the aforementioned scheme with an imple-
mentation on the Google App Engine for Java (GAE/J) and
another on the Amazon Web Services Elastic Beanstalk
(AWS/EBS). The two implementations are very similar
and actually their deployments on the two cloud plat-
forms are simply controlled by conﬁguration ﬁles that
specify the datastore each should look at and whether
or not to use the distributed in-memory cache. These
two were the only factors that diﬀerentiated the two
implementations.
The prototype implementations are available at the
following locations: the GAE/J demo at http://gaejppcf.
appspot.com/ and the AWS/EBS demo at http://gaejppcf.
elasticbeanstalk.com/. We usually keep the backend
database for the AWS/EBS demo switched oﬀ, so this
demo will only work fully during certain conferences
where we present this work. For the AWS/EBS demo, we
have used t1.micro EC2 instances.
For the sake of simplicity, we have not considered the
case where there may be more than one applications on
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the SaaS applications which interact with each other to
make a prediction, i.e. the scenario described in § “Ver-
tical Partition Across Multiple Organisations”. Also, for
test use, we have not implemented comprehensive error-
checking on the web front-end. One will notice that while
the web application provides means to perform crypto-
graphic operations, e.g. key generation, encryption and
decryption on the GAE/J and the AWS/EBS. These are
provided only for experimental purposes, and in practice
they should be performed at the client’s end. For browser
compatibility, we have used Google Web Toolkitb to code
the web-based user interface.
Conforming to Google App Engine terminology, we
will call the time taken by the application to respond to
the user request as application latency or simply latency.
This latency does not include network latencies encoun-
tered between our network and Google and Amazon data
centres.
Pre-computation
In the pre-computation stage, there is no cryptographic
operation on the cloud.
In the case of Google App Engine, the application
latency is dominated by the time taken to complete a
datastore write operation. Each such datastore write oper-
ation took between 80ms and 150ms using the High-
Replication datastore and about half that time while using
the Master-Slave datastore. We also performed bulk addi-
tion of pair-wise deviations. Figure 3 is a screenshot of
the Google App Engine control panel showing the typ-
ical load generated during the bulk data addition pro-
cedure. The bulk adding client generated 32 threads to
process a part of the MovieLens 100Kc dataset. The ﬁgure
shows data of the 14 automatically allocated applica-
tion instancesd. Each such instance can handle multiple
requests and are pooled in memory. The QPS (queries
per second) column shows the average number of queries
per second an instance received while the latency is the
average time taken by that instance to complete one such
request. This simulates the scenario if many users con-
currently submit many requests to add rating or deviation
data.
In the case of the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk, we adopted
a very diﬀerent approach to loading the complete Movie-
Lens 100K dataset. We had direct access to port 3306 of
the MySQL server EC2 instance running as part of Ama-
zon Relational Database Service (RDS). Consequently, we
pre-computed the deviation and cardinality matrices from
Figure 3 Typical load during pre-computation on the Google App Engine instances during partial bulk addition of the MovieLens 100K
dataset. Note that even if the latency, for example, in the third row is only 175.3ms, it does not equate to a QPS value of 1175.3 = 0.0057. The QPS
signiﬁes the number of queries the particular instance receives on an average while the latency signiﬁes how long the instance takes on an average
to process one such query. The fact that the latency is low does not imply that the QPS will be high because the QPS is the result of the queries sent
to the front-end, the speed of which is aﬀected by external factors, such as network latency, GAE/J queue processing speed and so on.
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the 100K dataset user-item rating matrix and then used
plain SQL to add that data. The process was faster and
more reliable than adding data to Google App Engine’s
datastore.
Prediction
The prediction stage involves one homomorphic encryp-
tion as well as several homomorphic multiplications.
Therefore, increasing the size of the encrypted rating vec-
tor typically linearly increased the time taken to predict.
It is not dependent on the size of the deviation and car-
dinality matrices. This is shown in Tables 1 and 2. Since
the recent version of GAE/J allows front-end instance
class conﬁguration, we have also included prediction
test results with the 1200MHz, 256MB RAM and the
2400MHz and 512MB RAM front-end instance classes
in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Note that the results pre-
sented in Table 1 were obtained using the previous version
of the GAE/J which did not allow front-end instance class
conﬁguration. The front-end instance class from the pre-
vious version roughly compares to the 600MHz, 128MB
RAM default instance class in terms of performance.
In terms of prediction performance, the less time it
takes, the better. In a realistic example, the prediction of
several items ought to be obtained with the user waiting
to see somemeaningful recommendations.While the pre-
diction may be obtainable in parallel and reported asyn-
chronously to the user (which falls in the remits of future
work), users will still expect meaningful recommenda-
tions presented to them in reasonably quickly, which is
often in order of just few seconds on a web browser or a
mobile application.
Note that given a 2048-bit Paillier cryptosystem, the
total prediction time with 10 encrypted ratings as the
input vector is reasonably fast: about 5 seconds, while
the prediction time improves by almost eight-fold on the
Google App Engine if we use a 1024-bit cryptosystem.
Sometimes, even if the input vector is large, pair-wise rat-
ings between the queried for item and the items in the
input vector may not exist, which will reduce the pre-
diction time. Another factor impacting on performance
Table 1 Comparison of typical prediction timings, based
on the optimised equation 6 on the Google App Engine for
Java





1Paillier cryptosystemmodulus bit size, i.e. |n|.
2Size of the encrypted rating vector.
Table 2 Comparison of typical prediction timings, based
on the optimised equation 6 on the AmazonWeb Services
Elastic Beanstalk using the t1.micro instance





1Paillier cryptosystemmodulus bit size, i.e. |n|.
2Size of the encrypted rating vector.
is the availability of the deviation and cardinality matrix
data on the distributed in-memory cache versus the data-
store, although in our Amazon implementation we did
not take advantage of Amazon’s in-memory cache – the
ElastiCache. In addition, GAE/J instances may also per-
form better or worse depending on the shared resources
availability on the Google’s cloud computing clusters. In
contrast with the Google App Engine, the results on the
Amazon Elastic Beanstalk are signiﬁcantly faster, with
almost a 5.5 fold performance increase for a 2048-bit
cryptosystem and query vector size 10.
In addition, we note that the t1.micro instance on the
AWS/EBS still outperforms the GAE/J 2400MHz front-
end instance class when using the 2048-bit cryptosys-
tem. This is explicable from the description of Amazon’s
micro instancese, which shows that not only do t1.micro
instances have more memory (at 600MB) than the GAE/J
but also have more powerful CPU available in short
bursts. In fact, the micro instances are particularly suit-
able for applications requiring occasional short bursts of
CPU, which is what our experiments do. Figure 4 presents
a performance comparison of the various GAE/J instance
classes as well as the t1.micro of AWS/EBS. The diagram
shows each class has four diﬀerent performance values.
The leftmost is the one for 1024 bits with a query vector
size of 5; followed by that with the query vector size of 10;
and then followed by that with the query vector size of 5
for the 2048 bit cryptosystem and the rightmost using the
2048 bits cryptosystem with the query vector size 10.
Table 3 Comparison of typical prediction timings, based
on the optimised equation 6 on the Google App Engine for
Java with the 1200MHz front-end instance class





1Paillier cryptosystemmodulus bit size, i.e. |n|.
2Size of the encrypted rating vector.
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Table 4 Comparison of typical prediction timings, based
on the optimised equation 6 on the Google App Engine for
Java with the 2400MHz front-end instance class





Paillier cryptosystemmodulus bit size, i.e. |n|.
Size of the encrypted rating vector.
Security
Insider threat in the cloud
Our implementation collects the IP address of the user
in an attempt to link the ratings to a particular IP. We
performed rating and deviation submission from a num-
ber of diﬀerent networks. So long as the same user did
not submit ratings and deviations from the same WAN
IP, the cloud application could do little to conclusively
link that speciﬁc user to his/her rating or deviation sub-
missions. The cloud only learns that a pair of ratings or
their deviation by a particular user (provided the user
identity changes in the consecutive submission), which
is even insuﬃcient to launch an oﬄine knowledge based
inference attack on the user’s private rating vector.
What if the user is dishonest?
If the user is dishonest, contrary to our assumption, then
it is evident that automated bot-based addition, updates
and deletions can disrupt the pre-computation stage.
Although we leave this for future work, one possibility is
to use CAPTCHA [27] to require human intervention, and
hence slow down the number of additions, updates and
deletions.
Conclusion and future work
Many existing privacy preserving collaborative ﬁltering
schemes pose challenges with practical implementations
on real world cloud computing platforms. In this paper, we
utilised the well-known weighted Slope One collaborative
ﬁltering predictor to demonstrate a novel approach for
privacy preserving collaborative ﬁltering and its practical
applicability on two public Software-as-a-Service enabling
Platform-as-a-Service clouds: the Google App Engine for
Java and the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk. In our scheme,
user’s rating data is not stored in the cloud. Our scheme
does not rely on any trusted third party for threshold
decryption by allowing the users to encrypt and decrypt a
prediction query and its results respectively. The results of
our experiments show that the user can obtain predictions
quickly despite encrypted rating queries, with results on
the Amazon Elastic Beanstalk outperforming those on the
Google App Engine.
Figure 4 Prediction performance comparison of the diﬀerent instance classes of the GAE/J and the t1.micro class of AWS/EBS.
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The scheme proposed in this paper partly relies on
the security guarantees of existing anonymising tech-
niques, such as NAT, pseudonyms or an anonymiser/mix
network. We discuss the relatively simple NAT-based
anonymity but also mention that it is possible to obtain
identiﬁability if need be. We also assume that the user is
honest. In future work, we plan to extend our proposed
scheme by discarding those assumptions. We also plan to
run more experiments with exhaustive user studies. We
also plan to enhance the rating query performance further
by optimising our implementation.
Endnotes
a This is an extended journal version of our prior work
“Privacy-preserving collaborative ﬁltering for the cloud”
published in the IEEE Cloudcom 2011.
b See: http://code.google.com/webtoolkit/.
c MovieLens datasets: http://www.grouplens.org/node/
73.
d This is a snapshot of the GAE/J control panel. The
number of instances change over time depending on the
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